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Alexander Snyder* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Food and Drug Agency (“FDA”) was created in 1938, no person at 
the time could have envisioned how important it’s role would become.1 Nor could 
any person have envisioned the types of medical breakthroughs the agency would be 
required to facilitate, and in certain instances, regulate. At the time of the FDA’s 
inception, acetylsalicylic acid, more commonly known as aspirin, was prescribed and 
used for almost every common ailment, with certain members of public choosing to 
take it every day for its “wonder” drug properties.2 Today, aspirin is only prescribed 
as a blood thinning agent after a cardiac event or stroke.3 In truth, aspirin would 
probably not have passed through the current regulatory and clinical processes to 
receive FDA approval; it has instead been “grandfathered” into current medical 
treatment.4 
Since its inception, not only has the FDA seen significant medical 
advancements, it has also seen fourteen administrations and numerous iterations of 
Congress. In that time, it has evolved to accommodate new and innovative therapies 
along with ever increasing costs associated with research and development. But it is 
time for the agency to evolve once again, to learn from its past mistakes, and rekindle 
its relationship with its true purpose—the health and welfare of the public. It is time 
for the agency and its controlling government to reckon with its place in the 
pharmaceutical landscape. 
The goal of this Note is to look at the background and history of the FDA 
regulatory landscape and its effects on drug prices as a result. Part II of this Note will 
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1 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399. 
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conduct an in-depth analysis of the FDA and related legislation concerning small 
molecule drugs and biologics. Part III will introduce monoclonal antibodies, a type 
of biologic, that is commonly associated with soaring drug prices today. Part IV will 
then focus on legislation and regulatory recommendations that could allow the FDA 
to shift its focus from favoring innovation to supporting competition and 
accessibility. 
II. FDA REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
A. Inception 
The FDA began with the enactment of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”).5 Like most legislation in this nation’s history, it was enacted in response 
to a crisis. “Dr. Massengill’s Elixir Sulfanilamide,” a drug marketed as a new anti-
infective treatment, lead to the deaths of 107 citizens.6 Congress viewed this event 
as a preventable tragedy that required immediate legal change.7 The real crux of the 
issue was that the elixir violated federal law because it was misbranded; the drug 
posed no actual danger to the public.8 However this misconception lead to the FDA’s 
birth, which primarily focused on protecting the population from dangerous drugs.9 
The FDCA complimented the creation of the FDA by defining what a drug was and 
ensuring that all drugs that met that definition would be subject to regulation.10 Under 
the FDCA, a drug is an article recognized by the official United States 
Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic Pharmacopoeia, or National Formulary that 
is intended for the use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of 
disease; or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.11 This 
definition of a drug is precise and inclusive, leaving room for articles that are used 
as drugs to fall outside FDA regulations.12 For example, certain articles, such as 
dietary supplements, that are still in the healthcare space fall outside of this definition 
                                                          
5 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399. 
6 Paul M. Wax, Elixirs, Diluents, and the Passage of the 1938 Federal, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 
122 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 456, 456–61 (1995). 
7 Id. 
8 DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 93 (Ira Katznelson et al. eds., 2010) (citing James Harvey 
Young, The ‘Elixir Sulfanilamide’ Disaster, 14 EMORY UNIV. Q. 230, 230–37 (1958)). 
9 Id. 
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and are not subject to the FDA regulatory process.13 Throughout its existence, the 
FDA has steadily evolved to match modern medical advancements along with the 
public desire for safe and efficacious drugs. As drugs become more and more 
complex, the asymmetrical relationship between producers and consumers has 
continued to grow. The role of the FDA has evolved to help consumers in bridging 
that gap, in alignment with the original reasoning for its creation. 
B. Evolution 
After the enactment of the FDCA, the FDA started its slow climb to its current 
“gatekeeper” role. Initially, before a “new drug” could be brought to market it had 
to be submitted to the FDA for pre-market approval via a notification system.14 In 
addition, the agency had authority over and ultimate control of the drug approval 
process.15 Even though the original FDCA legislation had no efficacious provision, 
it still gave the FDA and its officials significant control and flexibility in the types 
of regulations it could pass in regard to pre-market approval.16 Then, in the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision United States v. Dotterweich, the Court held that the passage 
of the FDCA in 1938 indicated that the legislature intended to hold the public’s 
health in high regard, and therefore, criminal liability should extend to those actors 
in control of the pharmaceutical companies seeking drug approval.17 This decision 
essentially gave the FDA teeth, since a violation of one of its regulations would lead 
to criminal liability of the pharmaceutical executives responsible.18 Due to a 
combination of flexible and powerful regulatory authority, the FDA began to slowly 
introduce efficacy components to its review process.19 Over time, FDA 
administrators and pharmaceutical companies began to work almost side-by-side to 
ensure that new pharmacologic developments would be up to standard of review.20 
                                                          
13 Id. 
14 See generally CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 73–117 (describing the initial legislation surrounding 
the FDCA and the powers granted to the FDA). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943). 
18 Id. 
19 See generally CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 118–227 (describing the growing nature of the FDA 
regulatory scheme following its inception in 1938 and eventually amendments in 1962 and how there 
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This allowed the FDA to dictate how research and development was done over the 
next 20 years.21 
This increase in regulatory power gave remarkable control over an industry for 
any agency, resulting in calls for deregulation. Drug regulation became almost a 
constant tug and pull between the FDA administrators and pharmaceutical company 
executives. This power struggle came to fruition in 1962 when the Kefauver-Harris 
amendment to the FDCA was passed.22 This amendment was a result of a mixture of 
events, most notably the thalidomide disaster of the early 1960’s.23 Thalidomide was 
a drug intended to treat morning sickness in pregnant women.24 FDA officials and 
physicians denied marketing of this drug in America due its negative outcomes 
observed in clinical studies.25 They simply did not believe it was safe enough to be 
given to the public. Their suspicions turned out to be correct when thalidomide was 
directly linked to severe adverse outcomes for European children.26 Mothers who 
had been using the drug were giving birth to children without arms and legs.27 
Horrified, the American public turned to the FDA; the agency’s denial and resistance 
to thalidomide served as the perfect catalyst for enhanced support of more 
government regulation over the drug manufacturing industry.28 The Kefauver-Harris 
amendment took the original pre-market approval system and built upon it, requiring 
the manufacturers to wait until the FDA had deliberated over and approved the drug 
for safety and effectiveness.29 In the past, the drug merely received a stamp of 
approval from the FDA, but the amendment gave the FDA strict control of what 
drugs were entered into the market.30 Additionally, the amendment made it a 
statutory requirement for the drug to not only be safe, but efficacious as well.31 
Ultimately, the amendment provided the FDA direct authority to examine a drug for 
                                                          
21 Id. 
22 Richard A. Merrill, Symposium on Regulating Medical Innovation: The Architecture of 
Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1764 (1996); see generally 
CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 228–97. 
23 Merrill, supra note 22, at 1764. 
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its therapeutic effect.32 Lastly, the amendment enlarged the FDA’s authority over the 
type of clinical trials conducted by manufacturers since the FDCA specified that the 
effectiveness of a drug must be shown by “substantial evidence,” defined by statute 
as “evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including 
clinical investigations, by expert[s] qualified to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug 
involved. . . .”33 This gave the FDA broader discretion and control of criteria for 
clinical efficacy.34 Just as they had with the inception of the FDA, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers began to model their processes to match these new regulatory 
barriers.35 These new barriers were designed to prevent drugs with no therapeutic 
benefit from being marketed.36 By the time the Kefauver-Harris amendment was 
enacted, there were numerous drugs that were on the market that were neither 
efficacious nor forgone the FDA pre-market notification process, aptly deemed “not 
drugs.”37 These older drugs already on the market were simply grandfathered into 
the scheme. 
In 1984, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act was 
passed as an amendment to the FDCA.38 It would become better known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act.39 The purpose of the act was to address a similar problem that patients 
of the current day know all too well—drug pricing.40 Congress believed that the best 
way to incentivize research and development, particularly of novel drugs, while 
keeping drug prices down was to enact different processes for brand and generic 
manufacturers.41 Brand manufacturers are the actors that specialize and seek out 
novel treatments and medicine in the hope that they can monopolize the market for 
a time. On the other hand, generic manufacturers specialize and produce drugs 
requiring little to no research and development, which allows them to sell their 
generic drugs at discounted prices.42 The problem Congress sought to address by 
                                                          
32 Id. 
33 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 




38 Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, and the 
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passing the Hatch-Waxman Act is two-fold. First, brand manufacturers were 
concerned about making money back on their investments in novel medicines and 
treatments.43 The Act addressed this problem by expanding the patent exclusivity to 
five years after approval of a New Drug Application (NDA) for market and 
distribution.44 Originally, the drug manufacturers would file for a patent when the 
original small molecule was synthesized or discovered.45 The current patent term 
lasts for 20 years. This term remains unchanged regardless of whether the NDA of 
the final product is approved 14 years later or 20 years later.46 The patent exclusivity 
term was added to incentivize drug manufacturers to develop new and effective 
medical treatments without concern for the traditional 20 year patent limit.47 During 
20 year patent term, the FDA cannot even consider generic manufacturers’ 
applications.48 However, after this term has expired, FDA consideration of generic 
manufacturers’ applications resumes. Such manufacturers are not required to prove 
that the drug is efficacious or safe. Rather, they simply require that the drug is 
bioequivalent or biosimilar by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA).49 Once an ANDA is approved and the generic drug enters the market, drug 
prices typically fall for both the branded drug and the additional generic counterparts. 
While the brand manufacturer has patent exclusivity it can enjoy high profit 
margins.50 
Second, the Orphan Drug Act was passed in 1983 to address another pressing 
issue in the drug manufacturing industry.51 Diseases such as Huntington’s disease, 
Myoclonus, ALS, Tourette Syndrome, and Muscular Dystrophy dramatically affect 
the quality of life of the patients diagnosed, but do not affect a large proportion of 
the overall population.52 Therefore, little incentive exists for drug manufacturers to 
                                                          
43 Id. at 1147. 
44 Id. at 1148. 
45 Id. at 1214. 
46 Uruguay Rounds Agreements Act, Pub L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 
47 Karshtedt, supra note 38, at 1147–48. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1149. 
50 Id. at 1149–50. 
51 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., OIE-09-00-00380, THE ORPHAN 
DRUG ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT 4 (2001), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00380 
.pdf. 
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develop adequate drugs for treatment.53 Drug manufacturers will abstain from 
investing greatly into these treatments and medicines because they will incur 
financial loss due to the small subset of the population affected by these diseases.54 
The Orphan Drug Act sought to rectify this issue by offering financial incentives to 
drug manufacturers to create treatments for these types of rare diseases.55 The law 
provides four specific incentives: (1) 7-year market exclusivity to sponsors of 
approved orphan products, (2) a tax credit of 50% of the cost of conducting human 
clinical trials, (3) federal research grants for clinical testing of new therapies to treat 
and/or diagnose rare diseases, and (4) an exemption from the usual drug application 
or “user” fees charged by the FDA.56 
C. Current State 
With the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Orphan Drug Act, 
Congress relied heavily on the promise and guarantee of patent exclusivity to 
incentivize innovation and research in an inelastic pharmaceutical drug market. 
However, when patent exclusivity is the only guarantee of profitability, 
pharmaceutical companies will go to great lengths to maximize that period. 
Over the course of the Orphan Drug Act’s thirty-seven year history, its use has 
been expanded extensively, causing increased concerns that it is being abused at a 
detriment to patients.57 Although the Act is still being used to incentivize research 
and development of pharmaceutical treatments for rare diseases, there is reason to 
believe that drug manufacturing companies are using the Act to circumvent and 
“game” the system by targeting “mainstream” disease states.58 Disease state is an all-
encompassing term that refers to any disorder, disease, condition, symptom, or 
indication.59 Essentially, pharmaceutical companies are promoting drugs that are 
indicated for a type of rare disease, but in reality they are being pushed and marketed 
for much more common disease states.60 This way, pharmaceutical companies 
acquire all the incentives guaranteed by the Orphan Drug Act and benefit from the 
                                                          




57 Michael G. Daniel et al., The Orphan Drug Act: Restoring the Mission to Rare Diseases, 39 AM. 
J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 210, 210–13 (2016). 
58 Id. 
59 Disease State definition, LAW INSIDER, https://www.lawinsider.com/dictionary/disease-state 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2021). 






J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XXI – Summer 2021 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










ability to market the drug to a larger patient population for a much more common 
disease state.61 It is easy to see the attractiveness of such an option. 
By 2020, orphan drugs, meaning those granted approval by the FDA under the 
Orphan Drug Act, are believed to make up roughly 20% of the prescription drug 
market when they made up only 6.3% of the market in 2000.62 These orphan drugs 
regularly come with a premium price tag, and are often 25 times more expensive than 
drugs that receive an FDA approval via traditional means.63 The cost of orphan drugs 
have increased over time as well with the average annual price of an orphan drug 
increasing from $7,136 in 1997 to $186,758 in 2017.64 
Admittedly, the increased price of orphan drugs is multifactorial. For example, 
most orphan drugs today are biologics that required significant funds relating to 
research and development. However, a key contribution to this increase in overall 
drug prices is this exploitation of incentives in the Orphan Drug Act. 
The abuse of patent exclusivity does not end with the Orphan Drug Act. There 
are numerous other examples of patent exclusivity being expanded beyond the 
traditional five-year exclusivity period granted by the Hatch-Waxman Act. “Product 
Hopping” is a term used for when manufacturers take an existing drug and file a new 
patent application for new formulations, different manufacturing processes, or even 
new indications.65 This method allows manufacturers to expand their patent 
exclusivity for the same active drug ingredient.66 Manufacturers also file for 
“secondary” or “double” patents as a way to extend their exclusivity period.67 
Secondary patents or “follow-on” patents are similarly related to the initial patent, 
but they claim to be a new active drug ingredient.68 They build off of the existing 
drug in the form of a new iteration of the active ingredient itself, such as the prodrug, 
                                                          
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Drug Prices for Rare Diseases Skyrocket While Big Pharma Makes Record Profits, AHIP 




65 Christopher M. Holman, Congress Should Decline Ill-Advised Legislative Proposals Aimed at 
Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 51 UNIV. PAC. L. REV. 493, 496–97 (2020). 
66 Id. 
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salts, isomers or certain drug metabolites.69 There is also reason to believe that these 
types of secondary patents are more frequently sought out when the initial active 
drug ingredient is more successful.70 Double patents are simply the same drug being 
re-patented. This is strictly precluded by statutory language but there is reason to 
believe that the “obviousness” standard applied by the USPTO is not a secure bar to 
prevent this from happening entirely.71 It makes complete sense from an economic 
perspective that manufacturers would seek out any way to extend this patent 
exclusivity. However, as highlighted with the Orphan Drug Act, when patent 
exclusivity is extended premium drug prices usually follow. 
In 2010, the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”) was 
passed as a part of healthcare reform.72 While the FDCA and Hatch-Waxman Act 
concern small molecule drugs, more typical medicines such as acetaminophen, 
lisinopril, or cetirizine, concerns biologics.73 Analogous and parallel to the 
aforementioned amendments to the FDCA, the BPCIA was enacted to promote 
innovation by ensuring market exclusivity.74 The BPCIA ensures that an innovative 
biologic will be afforded twelve years of FDA exclusivity.75 There is some debate as 
to whether the exclusivity relates to data or market exclusivity, since the statute was 
ambiguous.76 Regardless, the FDA has interpreted the statute to be referring to 
market exclusivity.77 Again, much akin to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the BPCIA 
provides an abbreviated pathway for the generic version of biologics, or 
biosimilars.78 The goal is to increase accessibility for manufacturers to produce 
biosimilars, allowing for a more competitive biologic market driving prices down.79 
The very nature of biologics and their developmental history is to blame for the 
two analogous pieces of legislation with seemingly the same exact goal. When the 
                                                          
69 Id. 
70 Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): 
An Empirical Analysis of ‘Secondary’ Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2012). 
71 21 U.S.C. § 355(d), supra note 33. 
72 Ude Lu, Note, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Striking a Delicate Balance 
Between Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 613, 613 (2014). 
73 Id. at 615. 
74 Id. at 613. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 262(7)(A). 
76 Lu, supra note 72, at 613. 
77 Id. at 636 (citing Notice of Public Hearing, 75 Fed. Reg, 61,498 (Oct. 5 2010)). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 262(k). 
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Hatch-Waxman Act was being passed, biologic development was in its beginning 
stages and those writing the statutory language could never have predicted the 
scientific breakthroughs that biologics would allow.80 Whereas small molecule drugs 
are synthesized, biologics are isolated from a variety of natural sources either human, 
animal, or microorganism.81 Biologics production require cutting-edge 
biotechnology methods at the forefront of biomedical research, but if successful, they 
may be used to treat a variety of medical conditions that were previously 
untreatable.82 Although biologics is a broad and encompassing term, monoclonal 
antibodies have garnered increased attention over the past two decades, and 
rightfully so. 
III. MONOCLONAL ANTIBODIES 
In recent years there has been a push for personalized medicine and the 
forefront of that push is monoclonal antibodies.83 The advancements in this type of 
drug development allows for numerous unique and innovative ways to treat a litany 
of different disease states.84 A complex science, the first monoclonal antibody was 
generated in 1975 and was first approved in 1986.85 In short, a monoclonal antibody 
is a monovalent antibody that binds to the same epitope and are produced from a 
single B-lymphocyte clone.86 They work by cloning certain white blood cells and 
almost highjack the body’s natural immune system to elicit responses for a variety 
of disease states including multiple types of cancer, autoimmune diseases and even 
combat certain types of hyperlipidemia.87 The first monoclonal antibodies were 
generated in mice and other animals but the efficacy and safety has increased steadily 
over the years as the science of developing humanized or human monoclonal 
antibodies came to the forefront.88 
                                                          
80 Id. at 615–16. 




83 Justin K.H. Liu, The History of Monoclonal Antibody Development—Progress, Remaining 
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Although they have become the face of novel medical advancements, 
monoclonal antibodies are exceedingly hard to get into the hands of the patients that 
need them, especially at an affordable price. More specifically, research and 
development of monoclonal antibodies is extensive and immense which undoubtable 
plays a role in the skyrocketing prices. 
For example, evolocumab (Repatha) is a human monoclonal antibody that 
binds to proprotein convertase subtilisin kexin type 9 (PCSK9) preventing it from 
binding to LDL-receptors that eliminate LDL from blood.89 Therefore, it allows for 
more LDL-receptors to be available to clear out LDL in the blood, which is a lipid 
that is closely linked to high cholesterol in patients.90 For treatment of high 
cholesterol, it has been shown to decrease LDL levels by as much as 60% and 
triglycerides by 36% whereas statins, the traditional first-line treatment, decreases 
LDL levels by 20-55% and triglycerides by 10-30%.91 Although there are legitimate 
adverse effect concerns regarding Repatha, such as injection site reactions and back 
pain, other cholesterol medications are associated with as many or more adverse 
effects.92 Healthcare providers are very resistant to administering this new drug 
instead of the traditional first-line treatment, statins, in large part because of the cost; 
the drug’s adverse effects do not play a role in healthcare providers’ aversion to 
prescribing this drug.93 Atorvastatin is one of the most common statins prescribed 
for high cholesterol and is usually first-line treatment.94 It costs roughly $10-20 a 
month for this medication.95 In contrast, Repatha costs $14,000 a year.96 
As previously stated, the increase in drug price could be due to the nature of 
the drug itself and the complex research involved in its development. However, 
Repatha received orphan drug status. Even though it is indicated as adjunct therapy 
for high cholesterol, a very common disease state affecting millions of patients, it 
has received orphan drug status for the adjunct treatment of homozygous familial 
hypercholesterolemia (HoFH).97 HoFH is a genetic disease that is characterized by 
                                                          






95 Atorvastatin (Lipitor), GOODRX, https://www.goodrx.com/lipitor (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
96 SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 89. 
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extremely elevated levels of LDL and a higher risk of atherosclerotic cardiovascular 
disease.98 There are numerous other examples that share a similar fact pattern such 
as infliximab (Remicade) which originally received orphan drug status as a treatment 
for Crohn’s disease but has since been indicated for more common diseases including 
rheumatoid arthritis, psoriatic arthritis and ulcerative colitis.99 
The real risk is when cost of treatments begins to affect the practice of 
healthcare. Healthcare professionals are acutely aware of the tradeoff between the 
effectiveness of novel treatments, such as Repatha, and the financial burden of 
obtaining such treatment. In some instances, it is better practice to prescribe the 
cheaper and slightly less effective option for patients. When only the wealthy have 
access to medications not due to government inaction, but instead, government 
action gone awry, the real issue becomes what is the government’s role as a self-
appointed regulator of an entire industry. 
IV. FDA RECOMMENDATION 
The concerns regarding the attack on guaranteed exclusivities are legitimate. In 
large part, these incentives have allowed for both great progress in medicine and for 
extraordinary funds to be committed to innovative breakthroughs in medicine. But 
as previously stated, the FDA has a unique position in relation to the pharmaceutical 
market that is not typically seen in other markets. They act as the sole gatekeeper to 
prescription drugs, preventing drugs without pre-market approval from sale.100 The 
FDA even monitors and controls drugs once they enter the market via phase IV of 
the clinical trial process, conducting post-market analysis on the safety and 
effectiveness of the drug long-term.101 This highlights the FDA pushing the 
boundaries of statutory authority in the name of public health and they should not 
stop there. 
                                                          
bin/Drugs_Search.php?lng=EN&data_id=112837&search=Drugs_Search_Simple&data_type=Status&T
yp=Med (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) [hereinafter Repatha]. 
98 Frederick J. Raal et al., Reduction in Mortality in Subjects With Homozygous Familial 
Hypercholesterolemia Associated with Advances in Lipid-Lowering Therapy, 124 CIRCULATION 2202, 
2202–07 (2011). 
99 Laura Joszt, Orphan Drugs Are Driving Skyrocketing Drug Costs, AHIP Finds, AJMC (Sept. 12, 
2019), https://www.ajmc.com/view/orphan-drugs-are-driving-skyrocketing-drug-costs-ahip-finds. 
100 Daniel Carpenter, Gatekeeping and the FDA’s Role in Human Subjects Protection, AMA J. OF 
ETHICS (Nov. 2004), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/gatekeeping-and-fdas-role-human-
subjects-protection/2004-11. 
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The modern drug manufacturing system is convoluted with various statutory 
and regulatory processes that were initially intended to both improve accessibility 
and innovation, seeming simultaneously. As with any free enterprise, the market 
players found ways to circumvent the system to their benefit. Whether it is the abuse 
of the Orphan Drug Act, product hopping, or double and secondary patents, there are 
numerous examples of manufacturers taking advantage of the current regulatory 
scheme.102 In fact, a review of the patent and market exclusivity extensions among 
top-selling prescription drugs found a median exclusivity duration of 12.5 (8.5-14.8) 
years.103 The argument defending these long exclusivity periods is centered on the 
belief that it will spurn innovation by providing proper economic incentives for the 
research and development required for drugs, especially biologics like monoclonal 
antibodies.104 While this may be true, drug prices have been soaring as a result. In 
2010, the top seven biologics represented 43% of Medicare Part B’s total budget.105 
Some analyses have found that by introducing biosimilars to the market competition 
will cause price discounts of anywhere from 10-50%, while the Congressional 
Budget Office estimated it could reduce drug spending by $25 billion over ten 
years.106 The average price discount of biosimilars in the European Union is 25-35% 
while the average savings of biosimilars in the United States resides somewhere 
between 10-37%.107 Even though there is a reduction of price in biosimilars, only 29 
have been approved by the FDA since the enactment of the BPCIA in 2010.108 For 
context, the FDA approved twenty-three biologics just in the year 2019 alone.109 
                                                          
102 Holman, supra note 65. 
103 Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael S. Sinha & Jerry Avorn, Determinants of Market Exclusivity for 
Prescription Drugs in the United States, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1658, 1658–64; 2017 (citing Bo 
Wang, Jun Liu & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Variations in Time of Market Exclusivity Among Top-Selling 




107 Deana Ferreri, Potential Cost Savings From Improving Biosimilar Availability in Slovakia, 
AJMC (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/view/potential-cost-savings-from-
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This Note suggests two broad recommendations for the FDA to take in order to 
better control monoclonal antibody prices through an overall limitation of FDA 
regulatory exclusivity. First, broad regulatory market exclusivity of five to nine years 
with +/- sliding scale adjusting for research and development costs. The Obama 
administration proposed reducing the twelve year period of exclusivity to seven 
years on many occasions.110 The PRICED Act was introduced previously and 
proposed to amend the BPCIA exclusivity period from twelve to seven years.111 The 
bill was proposed in the House of Representative in 2016 but died in Congress.112 
The bill has since been reintroduced to amend the exclusivity period from 12 years 
to 5 years, analogous to the biologic exclusivity period in other developed countries 
like Australia, but has yet to make any headway in Congress.113 This 
recommendation applies a slight extension to the proposed rule, with +/- 2 year 
sliding scale in either direction based upon costs associated with research and 
development. The more costs associated with the production of the biosimilar, the 
greater the length of exclusivity that the FDA will grant and vice versa. The purpose 
is to provide a mechanism that promotes economic incentives while reducing for the 
longevity of market exclusivity. 
Second, there should be stricter enforcement of the Orphan Drug Act. The 
statute needs reform to better represent the purpose for which it was created. It has 
been abused since its inception making up 20% of the prescription drug market in 
2020.114 In 2020, legislation was introduced to address a loophole in the Orphan Drug 
Act relating to manufacturers inability to cover costs of drug development when the 
previous iteration of the drug actually proved to be profitable.115 However, there has 
not been legislation to address “gaming” the system to grant seven-year market 
exclusivity for drugs that can treat profitable “mainstream” disease states in addition 
to orphan disease states. The monoclonal antibody evolocumab (Repatha) is a prime 
example of this practice.116 There should be legislative action to address this issue 
and loophole in its entirety. The proposed legislation should be enacted to steer the 
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act back to its original purpose of incentivizing drug development for rare and 
unprofitable disease states.117 If the drug, such as a monoclonal antibody, treats a 
rare disease but also happens to treat a more common disease state, there is no need 
to provide additional incentive through the Orphan Drug Act since the traditional 
economic incentives associated with a common disease state are present. However, 
there should be clear effort and emphasis to ensure that the amendments made to the 
Act do not result in a drug, like a new monoclonal antibody used in the treatment a 
rare disease, not being produced. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Soaring drug prices are one of the greatest challenges the American healthcare 
system is facing today. Among the most expensive of these prescription drugs is a 
type of biologic called monoclonal antibodies.118 Although the research and 
development of these cutting-edge biomedical entities is extensive, there are ways 
the FDA can operate as a gatekeeper to ensure increased market competition with 
the goal of driving prices down. Through legislation, the FDA can limit the 
stranglehold the exclusivity periods have on drug prices, allowing generics or 
biosimilars to enter the market sooner driving prices down or at least providing 
cheaper alternatives to patients. This Note suggests tipping the scales from favoring 
innovation to instead favoring competition and accessibility through implementing a 
sliding scale market exclusivity for biosimilars. The stricter and fairer enforcement 
of the Orphan Drug Act, more in line with the original intent of the legislation when 
it was passed in 1983, will also aid to help tip the scales from innovation to 
competition and accessibility.119 Legislation and regulation regarding patient care 
should always be driven by improving health outcomes of the patients by making 
drug prices cheaper and more accessible. Somewhere along the way, legislation and 
regulation focused more on ensuring that pharmaceutical companies can make a 
sizable profit. It is time to decide whether the goal of the pharmaceutical industry is 
to be for profit or for health. 
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